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For much of the past month, I have been reviewing the submissions to the inaugural Memory 
Studies Association (MSA) First Book Award. This year marks the start of a closer collaboration 
between this journal Memory Studies and MSA, including a dedicated Special Issue edited by 
members of the association. We hope that this will be a major step forward in enhancing reflection 
and critical debate on the nature of the field and the scholarly work that it comprises, building on 
the lively exchanges that have been a feature of the journal since its launch in 2008.  
Reading a selection of some of the most exciting emerging work in the area has left me with a few 
reflections of my own. Without going into the details of individual submissions – the winner of the 
award will be announced at the MSA conference in Madrid in June 2019 – it is clear that as a field 
Memory Studies is fortunate to have an impressive range of early career scholars, who display a 
combination of analytic acuity and creative enquiry that shows great promise for the future 
development of the field. Moreover, the diversity of the topics and sites of study are truly impressive 
in their international reach. While the journal and MSA have been predominantly European and 
North American in membership and contributors, these submissions show that a shift towards a 
different relationship between the global and the regional is underway.  
That said, reading across the submissions, one is struck with the specificity of the majority of the 
work, which is typically focused on a particular national or regional site. This is to be welcomed, of 
course, particularly in cases where it adds missing elements to the mosaic of knowledge of memory 
practices across sociocultural settings and gives voice to under-represented groups. However, it 
raises the question of how to judge the contribution made to the field as a whole by each individual 
work in the absence of a commonly agreed comparator.  
One solution is to draw upon the standards of each contributing discipline – history, media studies, 
sociology, psychology and so on. While this would help to clarify the particular merits of each work 
on its own terms, it displaces the problem of comparison further, since demonstration of expertise 
operates in different ways across disciplines. Crudely put, the tendencies diverge between seeking 
command of knowledge of particular socio-historical period or practice, or of a particular body of 
theoretical debate, or of a specific methodological paradigm. Each discipline has its own 
combination of these tendencies, but tends to place particular value upon one above the others. 
This makes ready comparisons across disciplines near impossible.  
For a truly interdisciplinary field such as Memory Studies, overcoming the weight of past in the form 
of contributing disciplines is a major task. If we are still debating the appropriateness of using a near 
100-year-old concept such as Halbwachs’ ‘collective memory’, then any sudden advance in thinking 
seems unlikely. In part, this is tied to a felt need to establish common definitions of the nature of 
memory in order to clarify the specific ways in which different perspectives contribute to the field as 
a whole. But this idea that agreement on common terms is a necessary precursor to the 
development of an area is at odds with contemporary understandings of interdisciplinarity (e.g. 
Nowotny et al., 2001), which emphasise external societal factors as drivers of research. The 
stakeholders and funders to whom we are ultimately accountable care more about what we can do 
with a concept like ‘collective memory’ rather than the place it might ultimately occupy in the 
theoretical firmament of Memory Studies. Moreover, as Barry and Born (2013) argue, the current 
rhetoric around interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity can sometimes mask the extent to which 
landmark work claimed by individual disciplines was itself the product of interdisciplinary 
engagement. Bartlett’s (1932) Remembering is an excellent example here – a foundational text in 
the history of Psychology that is, in actuality, a multi-layered dialogue with social anthropology. 
Forgetting the interdisciplinary aspects of a discipline’s history results in an over-reification of its 
modes of enquiry and traditions. 
I am not suggesting that we imagine a post-disciplinary future, where ‘memory’ and the ways in 
which it might be studied are entirely up for grabs. Rather, that interdisciplinarity here raises two 
closely linked issues. The first is with the status of theoretical discussions in the absence of clearly 
worked out conceptual distinctions and the relative excess of potential empirical material to draw 
upon. The second is with the role of comparison as an intellectual tool in relation to both diverse 
kinds of ‘data’ and, ultimately, different scholarly practices.  
The example of Social Anthropology is useful here. Academic reputation in this discipline comes in 
part from a close attachment to a specific field site, which can be either close or distant from the 
researcher’s institutional location. Maintaining a fidelity to the field, and, notably, to trusted 
informants, is a sign of quality, such that eminent researchers are as well known for who they have 
researched as for what they have actually said about them. Doing theory in Social Anthropology then 
involves not so much the application of a pre-existing set of categories to the research, but rather a 
sustained effort at exploring how the conceptual world of the field that the researcher comes to 
inhabit can be juxtaposed with the traditions of their discipline. For example, Marilyn Strathern’s 
decades long work in Melanesia directly informs her reconceptualisation of what the categories of 
‘person’ and ‘relation’ might mean for Social Anthropology (see Strathern, 2005). Similarly, the 
‘multinature’ paradigm associated with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro – which argues that ‘nature’ can 
be treated as constructed, while ‘culture’ seen as relatively stable, thus destabilising clear nature–
culture distinctions – arises from a prolonged engagement with Amerindian perspectives (see 
Viveiros de Castro, 2016).  
Comparison also has a unique place in Social Anthropology. Any act of comparing is based on a prior 
set of categories and relations that propose potential similarities and differences that constitute ‘like 
with like’. Training in any given discipline involves learning these categories and relations such that 
they become a sensibility, a matter of what tastes right and what does not. The interdisciplinary 
challenge of being asked to consider a different concept of memory or form of evidence can then 
feel rather like being served seemingly inedible food. Because the very nature of conducting 
research in Social Anthropology involves some degree of comparative work across cultural settings, 
comparison is regarded as a practice worthy in itself of investigation. The comparative practices that 
are present within a field are of clear concern to researchers, both in terms of what they show of the 
conceptual universe of persons being studied, and subsequently as provocations to thinking that can 
be ‘taken back’ to theoretical work. Bill Maurer (2005) has promoted Brown 115 the view that 
making unexpected or experimental forms of comparison underpin a ‘lateral reasoning’ that can 
produce novel insights. In all cases, the act of making comparisons, or studying how others make 
comparisons is generative of thinking rather than simply being an exercise of applying what is 
already known (see Deville et al., 2016).  
In Memory Studies, we have a multitude of different theories and different approaches to what 
theory is and how it is formalised. This lack of a general vocabulary clearly makes for some difficult 
conversations. But we also have very specific groups and settings that we work with. They should be 
a part of the conversation. When concepts are properly grounded in the relations and conceptual 
universe of a particular way of living, they cease to be matters of abstract speculation and become 
instead instantiations of a lived perspective. To debate a concept on this basis means comparing one 
or more lived perspectives with another and asking how the concept in question might impact on 
that world, what differences it might make, what kinds of disruptions it poses. The stakes become 
very different. Rather than seek a common, integrated theoretical framework, we can instead work 
towards ways in which diverse worlds might be juxtaposed together, without ever entirely merging. 
For example, in this issue, we enter the worlds of the ‘grandparent’s generation’ in post-Franco 
Spain (Aguilar & Ramirez-Barat), the ‘umbrella movement’ in Hong Kong (Lee et al), and the 
Romanian ‘latchkey generation’ (Pohrib). The authors all successfully make these worlds available to 
the community of memory scholars by demonstrating the actuality of memory as it worked out in 
each. A theoretical dialogue could then begin by asking what difference it would make to each world 
for a concept from another to enter into it, whether or not the concept could ‘live’ in that world.  
The papers by Quílez and Rueda on changing Spanish political documentary making and Nagy on 
Hungarian obituaries are remarkable in demonstrating how a close attention to an apparent ‘like for 
like’ can uncover differences and transformations. Here, the comparative practices of the particular 
setting, the ways in which similarities and distinctions are organised, become important. But the 
empirical richness of the papers also allows us to ask other kinds of questions – what would a ‘bad’ 
documentary or an ‘inappropriate’ obituary look like, and what would this tell us about the 
particular comparative practices themselves and the differences between them? We might then go 
to ask what within these practices seems to be disruptive of existing notions of collective memory, 
and how to reformulate the concept on the basis of these specific cases. We can also consider a 
novel or experimental comparison between Gustafsson’s analysis of the debate around the Great 
Chinese Famine on Weibo and Sodaro’s account of the National September 11th Memorial Museum. 
These are entirely different worlds in terms of media, historical period being recollected, national 
context, and doubtless numerous other features. The basis for the comparison would have to be 
invented speculatively. Yet, in forcing ourselves to do so, we would begin to develop a form of 
abstraction that remained grounded in the worlds themselves, a kind of intermediate level sat 
somewhere between strict empirical analysis and theorisation which would be distinct from a 
particular disciplinary location.  
So where does that leave the problem of establishing the value of a work to Memory Studies? It 
provides some criterion over and above a specific disciplinary contribution. Work that makes a world 
available to the scholarly community, enables it to become an object of debate on its own terms 
rather than serving as an example of an existing conceptual approach, becomes enormously 
important. At the same time, an account of the comparative practices through which memory is 
enacted within that world allows for a conversation of what various concepts actually do when seen 
from the perspective of that world, providing for a different, and I would argue, equally productive 
route into theorisation. Finally, work which makes itself amenable to comparison by drawing out the 
idiosyncrasies, the particularities of the world it describes, would have a crucial role in allowing for 
experimental comparisons. Sometimes, in a game, it is the odd-shaped piece or the very specific 
card that proves to be critical, at a certain moment, because it affords a move that would be 
otherwise impossible. It is the search for the novel and unusual rather than the universal and 
synthetic that makes things move forward.  
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